Left2Right Comments

I'll answer the last question with some questions.

1. Which would you rather know, the consequences of your actions, or moral principles?

2. Even if moral philosphers are better at lay people at determining moral principles, is the gap between scientists and lay persons in positive knowledge bigger than the gap between lay persons and moral persons?

3. Are all decisions made based soley on moral considerations? For example, if I ask a doctor about a treatment that might be ethically questionable, how much do I really care if the treatment is ethical?

4. Is there a difference between "professional ethics" and morality? Are there procedures which would be wrong for a doctor to perform or advocate (perhaps because it would give doctors as a class a bad reputation, which would have other harmful consequences, and/or run counter to a special moral principle doctors must follow, such as do no harm), but acceptable for a lay person to do?

5. Does the lack of consenseus among moral philosophers make reliance on them for answering moral question more dubious? If moral philosophers can't even convince each other what the "right" thing to do is, why should I trust the views of any given random philospher?
 

This is an intriguing and difficult issue which has nagged me for a long time. I'm not sure if I have much original to contribute but I guess I'd like to remind of a debate on this issue that for me has made the most sense of it, and then add a thought.

So, begin from Bernard Williams's thoughts on the topic. He made the famous distinction between thin, abstract moral concepts ('right', 'wrong', 'good', 'duty', and the like) and the thick moral concepts ('coward', 'lie', 'betrayal', 'honest' and the like) which are more substantial. Williams's crucial claim was that when it comes to the thin concepts nothing could count as expertise in applying them whereas in the case of the thick concepts there is expertise to be had.

Williams based his claim that there is no 'thin expertise' on familiar observations. It would be absurd to believe some moral claim on the basis of just the word of some theorist, who has thought about the issue for long, without yourself understanding the justification he gives for the claim. The situation really is completely unlike physics where we can take the scientists word pretty much at face value. And, I think he makes a similar point about medical treatment as Dworkin.

But, I think that Tim Scanlon's got a good point that the issue is not so simple. Williams himself made many first-order claims with thin concepts. Is it really that implausible to think of *that *he* said so* as at least some evidence for the truth of the claims he made? Maybe not to the point that we would accept his views as such on that basis, but we do seem to take his sayings to be good reasons for, for instance, re-examining our own views more. So, the idea of theoretical expertise is intuitively not so absurd after all. And it can be that why we do not go all the way to the acceptance is that the thin moral judgments are woven to our practice of justifying our actions and demanding justification from others. For this reason, we need to know on what basis we do this justifying - just saying that such-and-such said so doesn't cut ice here.

Williams was of course more symphatetic for the idea that there can be moral expertise based on the ability to reliably use the thick concepts. He thought that there are people who can be more reliable in using these concepts - who can see matters aright about whether something is cruel, honest, honourable, and so on, and who can also help us to see these matters more accurately in a way that can also guide our actions.

What is interesting for me is that Williams characterised the expertise one can have on the grounds of being able to use the thick concepts in moral judgments as 'certain capacities, such as judgment, sensitivity, imagination, and so forth'. Now, I don't think that it is plausible to say that philosophers would have more of these capacities than others just because they have taken part in theoretical, academic investigation. But, on the other hand, I do think that taking part in philosophical inquiry in right circumstances can improve one's judgment, sensitivity and imagination. So, I think that even in Williams's framework philosophy may go at least some very moderate way towards ethical expertise.
 

I gather you would pick a 30 year veteran of end of life medicine over a randomly chosen moral philosopher for your consultation.

But would you consult a random physician before consulting a moral philosopher who has worked on end of life medical issues for, say, the past 30 years?

And perhaps most importantly, would you prefer the experienced in end of life issues MD or the experienced on medical/end-of-life issues philosopher for your *ethics* consultation? Some of us philosophers who work on and teach about these issues know a whole lot more about the medical issues than the medical doctors know about the moral issues (the *practical* moral issues, not just the theoretical ones). That much is apparent from the best of the medical ethics literature.
 

Regarding Gerald Dworkin's final question, my choice would be based on whom I trusted more. The trust would be based on very little rational - more on my perception at their capacity for empathy, how they relate to my child (and me, to a lesser extent), perhaps their credentials, recommendations from others, etc., but their fields of expertise would probably be about the last thing I would rely on. And I would suspect, irrational as it may sound, that the majority of people would evaluate the situation the same way.

If I was unable to make a determination regarding a level of trust to either the moral philosopher of the doctor, then I would not rely on either of them and I would make the decision on my own.
 

I suppose my first inclination would be to consult the doctor, but apart from the points already raised, I have two inclinations which make me think this may be a misleading case. First, it is not my inclination to consult a philosopher about anything, because on issues where a philosopher is a relevant expert, I already have the opinion of a relevant expert available (my own). Second, I have a lingering tendency to think highly of the morality of doctors, partly perhaps conditioned by the general attitudes of our society, but also influenced by those I've known personally.
 

It's doubtful that many ethicists have the tools and research capabilities to measure the consequences of many activities--their expertise may be more concerned with the conceptualizing, the setting up of scenarios--or pointing out the assumptions of many current trends--in economics, politics, entertainment, etc..

Property issues for instance: in some sense Locke's ideas hinge on various ethical assumptions that are not really provable--(why does planting a tree mean that one is entitled to the harvest of it?) ...an ethicist, or at least competent political philosopher would most likely have a better explanation of property rights than the non-specialist

Perhaps thats 2nd order, but then separating first from second is not easy---

Ethics becomes a matter of empiricism rather quickly, especially in regard to environmental issues.
 

I suspect that I would consult the doctor for what he is trained in, namely medicine. He would know the details of the child’s condition and procedure, and could supply me with facts which may be needed for an ethical judgment. I would not consider this a consultation for an ethical judgment. This would simply be getting the data needed to make the judgment.

I would see nothing peculiar about consulting a philosopher who specializes in the relevant normative issues in order to get a better understanding of the normative issues to be considered. There are important issues which this philosopher could help clarify, and could be very useful in making the decision. I would not, however, go to this philosopher’s office and say, “Hey Jerry, should my grandfather move to Oregon so he can get a physician-assisted suicide?”

When my own students ask me questions of normative ethics, usually the best I can do is advise them on consistency issues. There are many things which a philosopher in the field may have considered, such as an analogical Trolley Problem, which could be very helpful. The reason to consult the ethicist but not ask for a yes/no answer follows.

It may be that the ethicist can give you a number of things to consider, and upon consideration you conclude that the procedure is right for your child. Perhaps you see it the situation as relevantly like a thought experiment in which action seems appropriate, or perhaps you realize that rejecting the procedure is inconsistent with another view you hold very strongly. Does this mean that the ethicist advised you to go through with the procedure and you are acting on his authority? No.

It may be that the ethicist actually holds the opposite opinion in the considerations. Perhaps acting in the thought experiment seems wholly inappropriate to him, or his other strongly held moral commitments are opposite of yours. If asked in a rush, he would have said “no,” but a real consultation may lead you be belief “yes” is the correct answer. Most philosophers are experts at maintaining internally consistent moral theories, but maybe not correct ones.

As for consulting the doctor, I find it likely that he will not be able to express his reasoning as clearly, or bring out issues for my consideration as well. He may have an inclination, but it may be rooted in an unstated theological belief or some other issue which I would disagree with if brought out. For my own decision making, I would feel more confident getting moral considerations from the ethicist.

What if we bring out a few details of the scenario however? Say you have to make a decision immediately. Your child is prepared for a surgery which must be begun in fifteen minutes or not at all, but there are complicated ethic issues involved! Luckily, there is a doctor who has worked on these surgeries and the alternatives much in the past, but would not be working on this case at all so you need not worry that he is biased in this case. Also, there is an ethicist who specializes in normative issues in cases such as this. Without knowing anything about their opinions, past work, religious or philosophic commitments, you can choose to ask one of them. We can assume that it will take them 14 minutes to get the relevant facts of the situation before making their judgment with no time to explain their reasoning. Now who do you ask?

Personally, I would ask the ethicist, but it is simply because I think they are more likely to have an opinion like that which I would have if I were to have time to consider it. I like to assume that I would come to the correct answer, and that the ethicist would then be more likely to tell me the correct answer. I, however, study ethics and thus I am no better than anyone else at figuring out how well doctors discover moral truths.